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Abstract  
Purpose: Artificial intelligence has had a major impact on organisations from Banking through 
to Law Firms. The rate at which technology has developed in terms of tasks that are complex, 
technical and time consuming has been astounding. The purpose of this article is to explore the 
solutions that AI, RegTech and CharityTech provide to charities in navigating the vast amount 
of anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance legislation in the United Kingdom; so that 
they comply with the requirements and mitigate the potential risk they face but also develop a 
more coherent and streamlined set of actions. 
Design/methodology/approach: The subject is approached through the analysis of data, 
literature and, domestic and international regulation. The first part of the article explores the 
current obligations and risks charities face, these are then, in the second part, set against the 
examination of potential technological solutions as at August 2020. 
Findings: It is suggested that charities underestimate the importance of the nature and size of 
the threat posed to them, this is significant, as demonstrated, given the growing size and impact 
of the sector. Technological solutions are suggested to combat the issues charities face.  
Originality: The work is original because it is the first to create the notion of CharityTech, and 
to specifically explore what technological advances can assist charities in meeting the 




Artificial intelligence (AI) is changing the face of fundraising. The ability of AI to automate 
the tasks often considered as ‘tedious’ generates immense benefits for instance creating time 
for those seeking to raise funds to do the necessary strategizing and donor networking. AI, data 
analytics and machine learning (ML) may sound like commonplace buzzwords, but their 
potential is being built into organisation technology systems as innovative solutions to the 
issues relating to manpower or human resource, compliance and the management of risk. In 
this article we explore how AI, we have termed this CharityTech, can help alleviate a notable 
problem facing charities where fundraising is concerned; how to prevent their systems being 
used to launder money and finance terror. In so doing we investigate whether AI is a 
trustworthy component in the future of fundraising for the not-for-profit charity sector.  
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1. Charities in the United Kingdom  
 
Before considering the issues facing charities in terms of financial crime, both practically and 
theoretically, defining the organisations that are the subject of this research.  
Charities’, in England and Wales, are regulated organisations formed for particular charitable 
purposes. In law they are purpose trusts[1] without named beneficiaries. They fall into the 
voluntary sector but are distinguishable; the sector includes many other non-profit and non-
charitable organisations. Often the charitable sector will be referred to as the ‘third sector’ 
alongside the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sectors. Sections 1 – 3 of the United Kingdom’s Charities 
Act 2011 set out the legal definition of a charity, of charitable purpose and the description of 
that purpose. Save in short, the latter is to prevention or relief of poverty of the advancement 
of education or religion etcetera[2].  
Charities may choose to set themselves up as companies[3] limited by guarantee with trustees 
as board members. Shell charities pose specific regulatory problems. A shell corporation[4] or 
company is set up in compliance with the relevant legislation and has financial assets but 
conducts little or no business activity. The purpose of this organisation is to act as a conduit 
through which financial transactions can be undertaken anonymously. Whilst they can be 
utilised for legitimate purposes i.e. asset storage for start-ups, they are often used for illegal 
purposes such as money laundering. Shell charities often fall into the latter category[5] and 
therefore pose a major financial crime risk. Regardless of the form they choose the principles 
that apply to ‘charities’ must be adhered to. It is salient to note that, whilst beyond the scope 
of this article, the rules of equity, various fiduciary duties and the duty of prudence, care and 
skill as set out in the Trustees Act 2000[6], all seek to regulate the actions of the decision 
makers within a charitable operation. The Charity Commission seeks to promote transparency 
in the financial affairs of third sector organisations with the main aim of sustaining and possibly 
increasing charitable giving. Maintaining ‘donor’ trust and confidence is important in this 
endeavour, something that is discussed in relation to AI later in this article. There are obvious 
financial i.e. tax benefits[7] to charitable status, this is a matter beyond the scope of this article 
but may present problems relating to fraud in its own regard for the exchequer.  
In 2018, there were over 212,063 charities registered in the United Kingdom, 19,731 operating 
overseas. This poses a significant compliance challenge both for the authorities and the 
charities[8] as discussed later in the paper. It is salient to begin the discussion with the forms 
of abuse that charities face.  
2. Charities and their Fundraising Aims  
 
There is no human endeavour that is oft-presented more worthy of praise than not-for-profit 
fundraising. The traditional methods used to generate funds[9] namely; grants, networking and 
donor dinners, direct giving from corporate foundations, meetings in coffee shops etcetera need 
to be supplemented to fund what are often referred to in the charity sector as ‘change-the-world 
initiatives’. AI provides an answer to achieving low human resource costs whilst maintaining 
high-levels of relationship-building and outreach as discussed later in the paper.    
 
AI, of which ML is a constituent technology, allows a machine to act, comprehend, learn and 
sense just like an individual would. It is transformative; the relationship between people and 
machines is changing at a phenomenal rate, AI harnesses human ingenuity but does so with 
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alarming precision and speed. Recent experiments show that AI outperforms humans, and some 
of the best lawyers, in the completion of various legal functions[10].  
 
Charities, like companies, also have large compliance and legal departments sometimes 
fragmented and potential liabilities, AI has benefitted the legal function in terms of the quality 
of information received by compliance officers and lawyers, and the speed[11] at which it can 
be reviewed by them which can lead to mitigation of regulatory risk and massive costs savings. 
One of the issues that the technology is grappling with is bias, it still needs to be ‘taught’ 
through data entry and confirmation by human subjects and that introduces potential pitfalls; 
including questions relating to the competency of the ‘teachers’, unconscious or subjective bias 
i.e. racial, gender or ideological biases, the production of biased data without due regard and 
assessment of its origins, a lack of critical thinking and trust[12] in decision-making. This 
problem persists throughout automation via AI but it is arguable that the benefits outweigh 
these issue because they can be rectified. IBM suggests that bias in AI occurs in the data or 
algorithmic models that are used[13].  AI also poses a significant risk to the compliance and 
lawyering functions as well as ethical issues but the automated settlement of disputes or ‘digital 
dispute resolution’ will benefit charitable organisations in terms of legal risk mitigation and 
notable costs savings[14].  
 
In terms of fundraising there are a number of benefits. The many discussions on data 
analytics[15] (DA) will not be repeated in this article, the thrust of DA often involves using 
technology as a disruptor by changing the very foundation of how information works to 
promote a denser and richer higher-level collaboration amongst stakeholders. Benefits[16] 
include better targeted campaigns, creation of innovative and tailored products and for the 
purposes of this article to manage legal and regulatory risk[17].  
 
3. Legal Problems with Charitable Fund Raising   
 
Charitable spending in England and Wales totalled around £80Bn in 2019[18], this could rise 
to £146Bn by 2030[19]. Cybercrime, anti-money laundering, counter-terror finance and fraud 
are all matters that affect charities (GCHQ, 2020)[20]. The rise in the use of technology has 
resulted in an increase in ‘faceless’ crimes carried out by organised crime groups (Reichel, 
2019)[21]. In addition, there has been a rise in relation to the number of fraudulent transactions 
too. Across the world financial crime has increased exponentially, Price Waterhouse Cooper’s 
Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey (2020) revealed losses in the firms they work with 
across 99 territories to the value of $42Bn[22]. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the 
regulator of financial firms in the United Kingdom, suggests that in 2019, the serious and 
organised crime that money laundering facilitates costs the United Kingdom £37Bn every year, 
and the annual cost of fraud is estimated to be around £190Bn every year[23].  
 
The FCA published a financial crime statistical analysis[24]. In 2018, there were 923,000 
suspicious activity reports made by automated systems and employees to the Money 
Laundering Reporting Officers’ (MLRO) within those regulated financial firms within the 
United Kingdom, and after investigation 363,000 of these cases were reported to the National 
Crime Agency for further action, and it is salient to note that 2100 of these were terrorism-
related[25] suspicious activity reports. The human resource cost to employ ‘checkers to check 
those checking’ is great, reductions in relation to which, that AI brings, is clearly advantageous.  
 
The United Kingdom’s Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) identified various 
instances in which charities have been the victims of scams. In terms of fraud, charities, are 
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susceptible to fictional or fake payments, donations by mystery donors and loans as a means to 
launder money all to the detriment of the charity. What follows is a brief discussion of each of 
these.  
 
3.1. The Fictional or Fake Payment  
 
This is a common method of diverting funds to criminal organisations to launder money and 
fund organised crime and terror related activities. The fraudster will make a donation to the 
charity on the basis that part of the donation is made by it to a fictional charitable organisation 
in another country. The donation will be made using stolen details i.e. credit cards or other 
forms of payment, once the sum is received by the charity it then sends the conditional donation 
onwards. The fraud is uncovered at a financial institutional level and the total sum is recalled 
for which the charity is liable. By then the money has been laundered and the charity has 
become the victim of financial crime.  
 
3.2. Mystery Donors  
 
The second instance involves the disposal of the proceeds of crime to prevent detection and 
prosecution. Often, donors wish to remain anonymous for a variety of reasons. However, 
donations whether cash or otherwise, often through a third person, where the identity of the 
donor is withheld are used to dispose the proceeds of crime.  
 
3.3. Loans  
 
This is similar to the fictional or fake payment, here a donation is made with restrictions 
attached to it for example; it must be used for a specific project or with a particular company 
or organisation. This is a mechanism used to launder money by placing the proceeds of 
criminality into the financial system via the charity. The latter becomes the ‘vehicle’ through 
which the funds are then transferred overseas for instance a project paid for or the requisite 
partnership undertaken, and their origin is therefore disguised i.e. they have been layered. 
These monies are then often used in further organised crime or re-integrated through the 
purchase of assets.  
 
Any loans where the charity is allowed to keep the monies for a set period of time and the 
interest accrued or earnt, after which the principal sum must be returned indicates that this is a 
high-risk transaction. Also, loans made in one currency i.e. dollars ($), with unusual conditions 
attached and then the loan must then be returned in a different currency for example pound 
sterling (£).  
 
3.4. Tax Avoidance or Evasion  
 
A donor may seek to benefit from tax relief on their donation but at the same time gain a private 
benefit for example they may insist that the donation be used to purchase services on beneficial 
terms from a company with which they are associated.  
 
In trying to protect the charity trustees would try to identify suspicious activity for example 
large amounts of money, requirements or conditions precedent, complex banking and transfer 
methods, or loans disguised as donations. This when undertaken manually, as is the current 
practice across the charity sector, is a complex and time consuming endeavour which can be 
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very costly but is also subject to common human error which can lead to breaches of legal 
requirements. Technology can resolve this issue, the benefits of automation in relation to this 
are discussed later.  
 
4. Economic and Financial Crime 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) outlines that 
economic and financial crime poses a major obstacle to development[26] because valuable 
resources are lost through criminal activity and this is particularly acute for fragile countries 
who are often the beneficiaries of charitable funds. These funds have a ‘spoiler’ effect, in that 
it money that should be used to rebuild public services i.e. education, health, justice and 
security are diverted.  
 
4.1. Governance and the Compliance Toolkit  
 
Charities owe particular legal duties as set out in the Charities Act 1992, Charitable Institutions 
(Fund-Raising) Regulations 1994 and the Charities Act 2006 and now the Charities Act 2011. 
Before discussing the legal framework in which anti-money laundering and counter-terror 
finance exists within the United Kingdom (ibid), it is salient to outline some areas of the basic 
regulatory compliance scheme.  
 
The simple way in which charities can prevent themselves becoming the victims of crime and 
financial abuse is to have proper governance and management procedures, and effective 
financial controls in place. For instance the adoption of ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) and 
‘Due Diligence’ (DD) procedures on every transaction i.e. money coming into and going out 
from the charity and those that work with it. These are grounded in the legal duties of the 
trustees, designed to protect the assets of the charity and are referred to as the ‘Know Your’ 
principles[27]. Charities must have and carry out DD to mitigate financial crime, financial 
institutions require this of them. Thus, charities need to have risk-based processes know about 
their affiliated organisations, beneficiaries, donors, employees, partners, suppliers and 
volunteers. The risk-based approach means a greater level of due diligence is required, this 
should form part of a financial crime policy that is agreed by Charity’s the Trustees. Many 
organisations struggle with regulatory compliance because of the issues of using paper-based 
systems which are, amongst others, human fatigue, forgetfulness, sloppiness and time pressure.  
 
The problems of charities being misused are more acute where they are operating in countries 
that have been sanctioned or those that are higher risk or where they are dealing with 
‘Politically Exposed Persons’ (PEPs). In terms of the latter corruption is a particular concern. 
They must comply with the sanctions and any other export control laws too. Terrorists often 
exploit these situations[28].   
 
The problem is further exaggerated by increasing levels of regulation which leads to the 
requirement for continuous updating and symptomatically rises in compliance costs i.e. fines, 
business disruption and productivity loss and budgets[29]. 
 
The Charities Commission’s Compliance Toolkit[30] helps charities verify the end use of 
charitable funds, it states that ‘… ensuring proper internal and financial controls and risk 
management procedures are in place and implemented is vital’[31] but it does suggest an 
adequate set of solutions, technological or otherwise in this regard. Therefore, whilst the online 
toolkit is a small step towards clarity it is not one that aids resolution of the problems. The 
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‘grey’ areas on application of the rules and reporting still exist[32]. It is not automation of the 
regulatory compliance function, and charities are not using basic AI in that regard[33]. The 
guide is not, at the most basic, even machine-executable principles that internal AI based 
compliance systems could utilise to automatically update systems and processes without 
human interference akin to that being promoted in financial services compliance reporting[34]. 
The toolkit falls prey to the same human-factors which are eradicated by automation and 
therefore charities are failing to take advantage of potential reductions to the costs of non-
compliance.  
 
5. Legal Duties Counter-terror Finance (CTF) and Anti-money Laundering (AML)  
 
5.1. Terror Financing  
 
The United Kingdom has an extensive regime for the prosecution of terror criminal offences, 
these are contained in the Terrorism Act 2000[35] (TA), in force as at 19.02.2001. At an 
International level there exists a lack of consensus and an obvious ideological struggle in 
seeking to define terrorism[36]. This means that the definition varies across jurisdictions, 
creating an obvious compliance issue for charitable organisations. The TA 2000 defines 
terrorism as ‘the use of a threat or action that is designed to influence a government or 
international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; 
made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause and which 
involves or causes serious violence against person(s), serious damage to property, a threat to 
life, a serious risk to the health and safety of the general public or serious interference with or 
a disruption to an electronic system’[37]. It is also salient to note that the European Union’s 
Council Framework Decision on combatting terrorism 2002/475/JHA introduces a specific and 
common definition of terrorism.  
 
Terrorists need to access money and property (assets) to organise as a group, buy weapons, to 
travel, accommodate and train so that they may co-ordinate, plan and execute their attacks. 
They may engage with legitimate organisations to generate income, the differences in 
geographical location may make detection impossible. Terror attacks are often carried out by 
small groups often using small amounts of money. Although, the size of the money seems 
minimal in risk terms they present a great challenge for charitable organisations in terms of 
terror finance and money laundering (the latter is discussed later). Thus, cutting-off the supply 
of money and assets to them is probably the most effective way of fighting terrorism and 
preventing future attacks. The outcome is to disrupt their material support, reduce their 
purchasing power and their ‘transaction histories’ i.e. withdrawal, transfer of funds and digital 
purchases provide valuable evidence for investigating and prosecuting authorities. This raises 
two interrelated issues; the first is absolute regulatory compliance which will vary according 
to the jurisdiction within which the charity is operating a problem exaggerated by cross-
jurisdictional operations; like any other organization, the charity[38] must also develop 
mechanisms to ensure that it is not being unwittingly used to finance terror. The second, this 
level of regulatory compliance is problematic for charities seeking to maximise operational 
cost efficiency. 
 
The legislation creates a number of criminal offences relating to terrorism and one of the most 
relevant, for the purposes of this article, is fundraising, financing, encouraging and supporting 
terrorists. The legislation gives investigating agencies (police) powers and the TA 2000 allows 
the Home Secretary to ‘proscribe’ organisations. For charities, and the trustees, this is 
particularly relevant in terms of proscribed groups, the duty to report suspicions and terrorist 
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financing is concerned. The Terrorist Asset Freezing Act (etc.) 2010 an entity or person can be 
‘designated’ where HM Treasury has reasonable grounds to suspect (for interim designation) 
or believe (for final designation) that (a) they are or have been involved in terrorist activity and 
(b) they are owned, controlled or acting on behalf of or at the direction of someone who 
does[39].  
 
Sections 15 – 18 of the TA 2000 creates a number of offences some of the most relevant to 
charities include; raising funds or donating money to a proscribed organisation; receiving or 
providing money or property where it is intended or where there is reasonable cause to suspect 
that it may be used for the purposes of terrorism; facilitating money laundering and failing to 
report suspicions of terrorist finance offences to the police. The Terrorism Act 2008 amended 
the 2000 Act, it is now clear that the reporting requirements i.e. where there is belief or 
suspicion, apply to charities and their trustees.   
 
The Terrorism Asset Freezing etc. Act 2010, amongst other things, makes it an offence to make 
funds, financial services or economic resources available for the benefit of a designated person. 
The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places the Prevent Duty[40] on a statutory 
footing; it applies to Higher Education Institutions and Colleges (Tertiary Education) in the 
U.K., these may be registered as charities and must ensure compliance.  
 
Specifically, it is an offence for a charity to provide funds to proscribed individuals and/or 
organisations, to any organization it suspects as being a terrorist one. The salient point to note 
is that in relation to the latter it may not appear on any of the lists relating to proscribed 
organisations or individuals. In terms of the challenge, continuous manual physical inspection 
and audits are required something that AI do without the additional manpower with a higher 
level of accuracy (as discussed later).  
 
This is relevant to both charities and anyone raising money for charities that are registered or 
charitable causes i.e. fundraisers, volunteers and the trustees themselves. If they have 
a ’reasonable cause to suspect’ that the money they are raising may be used for terrorist activity 
they will have technically committed an offence contrary to the TA 2000 as amended. 
Interestingly, the offences can be committed by donors if they know or suspect that it will be 
used for terrorism.  
 
The risk is not mitigated if the activity takes place overseas. Section 63 of the TA 2000 states 
that U.K. nationals and residents who commit an act(s) overseas which, if committed 
domestically, would amount to a terror finance act per ss.15 – 18 then they will have committed 
an offence and will be subject to relevant due process. Therefore, charities operating 
internationally must make sure their actors overseas stay within the requirements of U.K. law, 
another issue that AI can quite easily resolve – we will discuss the practicality later in this 
research.  
 
The problems or abuse (financial) suffered by charities can take a number of different forms. 
The most common[41] are as follows;  
 
• Establishment of a charity as a conduit through which monies can directly or indirectly 
fund terrorism;  
• Public collections that are in the charity’s name or for particular causes i.e. 
humanitarian crises and natural disasters, the funds are then used to finance terror 
activity without the charity’s knowledge;  
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• The diversion of charitable funds when transferred into different currencies digital or 
via cash transfer and places, here the beneficiary never receives the money;  
• The transportation of funds using a charity’s name so as to avoid being questioned or 
challenged by the relevant authorities;  
• Simple misuse of charitable donations, received for purpose A but expended on 
furthering terrorism; and  
• Money laundering (discussed later).  
 
Charities that operate in high-risk places i.e. Syria and Iraq, where the charity has a low annual 
income or those that are newly registered are particularly open to abuse[42]. Even though, the 
problem of charity involvement in terrorism being relatively small in relation to the cumulative 
size of this third sector does not detract from the compliance requirements in law, but also from 
the perspective that criminals will always seek weak links to exploit and such scandals 
undoubtedly damage the reputation, trust and confidence that the public place in charities and 
their work. It is salient to state that ‘respect, trust and confidence’, with all commercial 
enterprise[43] and where charities are concerned, has commercial value that must be properly 
protected. Charities must have proper risk-based policies and procedures, and systems to ensure 
they are not the victim of abuse, the automation of which has taken place in many industries 
already i.e. RegTech, FinTech and InsureTech[44].  
In sum, charities must ensure that the obligations set out in U.K. anti-terrorism legislation are 
discharged effectively. That charity trustees not only comply with the law but are vigilant in 
making sure that the charity’s assets i.e. property including premises, its staff, volunteers and 
other resources are not used for the promotion or support of terrorism as outlined.  
5.2. Money Laundering  
 
Money laundering is unlawful as set out in Part Seven of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
(POCA). In contrast to terror finance which concerns the illegitimate use of legitimate money, 
money laundering is the reverse. Here charities can be used as the mechanism through which 
illegitimate assets are converted into legal or legitimate ones. In this instance, criminal acts 
generate profit for the person or group, often organised criminals or drugs cartels, through the 
conversion of illegal gains into legitimate untraceable money. This is the process where the 
proceeds of crime are disguised so that they may then be enjoyed without bringing into 
jeopardy the source from which they came[45]. This is completed via a three-stage process; 
placement[46], layering and integration. What follows is an overview, a discussion beyond this 
is outside the scope of this article.  
 
In stage one, the criminals place the profits of crime into the financial system i.e. a single or a 
number of banks. The money may come in the form of several small sums[47] to avoid easy 
detection, even by the most experienced of officers, so as to frustrate the possibility that a 
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) per the legal requirements will be raised, something AI can 
easily achieve (discussed later). 
  
In stage two, the ill-gotten gains are layered, transactions are made to distance the money from 
its original source, for example shell charities are legitimately created but with the primary 
purpose of receiving such assets in the form of donations. In stage three, the final of the stages; 
the money is integrated back into the ‘white’ economy[48] i.e. purchase of assets or making 
loans. The use of conditions in donations requiring the money be spent on a particular project 
or partner, the latter may be a complete fiction, are examples of this, as is the use of shell 
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charities that can enter into various financial transactions without revealing particular 
information whereby the origin of funds can be hidden.   
 
The detection of this activity, patterns of behaviour that raise suspicion is difficult and can be 
labour intensive, therefore costly. Again, matters that AI can easily tackle, but that requires 
requisite financial investment that can pay dividend in the long term, where costs are concerned, 
but also in terms of regulatory compliance.  
 
5.3. International Regulation: Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) and 
the U.K. Charities Commission   
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental global terror finance and 
money laundering watchdog that sets international standards aiming to prevent both these 
activities and mitigate the harm caused to society. Its ‘recommendations’ or standards, try to 
ensure a consistent global response to current and new risks, 200 nations have signed up to 
implementing them. Much of the domestic legislation, including EU Law, is based on these 
standards i.e. The Fifth Money Laundering Directive (EU) 2018/843 and Statutory Instrument 
(SI) 2019 No.1511 Financial Services, The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
(Amendment) Regulations 2019. FATF suggests that the United Kingdom’s counter-terror 
finance policy has three parts; deter via safeguards and supervision, detect through financial 
intelligence i.e. information garnered from money laundering controls so that the actors can be 
identified and targeted, and disruption by seizing assets and prosecution[49].  
 
The Charity Commission in England and Wales[50], the regulator and supervisor of charities’ 
in the United Kingdom, can investigate a charity for abuses and issues guidance on regulatory 
compliance etcetera. The Commission, like other regulators in the United Kingdom, tries to 
strike a balance between effective but not overburdensome regulation, innovation and 
efficiency. In so doing, it approaches its function to; raise awareness, oversee, supervise, co-
operate and intervene where necessary[51]. Chapter 1 Module 8, of the Compliance Toolkit 
requires charity trustees to:  
 
- Comply with the law;  
- Act within the charity’s interest, avoid it being exposed to undue risk and its assets are 
used only for its charitable purposes. In so doing, the trustees must:  
o Take reasonable steps to ensure its premises, assets, employees (etc.)  cannot be 
used for activities that may, or appear to, support or condone terrorism or 
terrorist activities;  
o Put in place and implement effective procedures that prevent terror 
organisations taking advantage of the charity’s assets, facilities, reputation or 
status;  
o Take immediate action to disassociate the charity from activity outline in point 
1 above; 
o Take all reasonable steps to ensure that the activities of the charity are 
transparent and open, and cannot be misinterpreted; 
o Safeguard the charity’s assets;  
o Ensure that proper control is exercised over financial affairs;  
o Concerns about a charity’s links with terrorism should be reported by any 
stakeholder i.e. beneficiary, employee or trustee[52].  
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5.4. Charities: Further TF and ML Problems  
 
The range of risks charities face have already been highlighted, there are however a number of 
further abuses that require consideration too. Charities, unlike other company forms, are 
especially attractive to criminals because they are often perceived as being outside the 
regulatory gaze. This perception is challenged by the continued extension and application of 
law i.e. the criminalisation of acts or omissions, to charitable organizations; thus, charities 
should make more intelligent use of AI, the benefits of which they are not currently harnessing. 
FATF Recommendation 8, ‘Combatting Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations’, is particularly 
good example[53]. Thus, Charities are very much within the regulatory gaze domestically and 
internationally regardless of their size[54]; compliance with financial sanctions regimes is a 
good example of this. Adherence with the Charities Commission’s Governance Code 
(2017)[55], which incidentally is neither law nor binding, is considered to be ‘good governance’ 
and adopts the ‘comply of explain’ position of the UK Corporate Governance Code[56].  
 
5.5. CTF and AML Risks 
 
There is a lack of universal criteria on the determination and assessment of the risk terror 
finance risk that is posed in particular countries or regions. There are however identified 
nations that pose significant risk to charities that must be mitigated, these are nations that may 
be subject to United Nations sanctions or embargoes[57]. The United Kingdom’s Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), Transparency International[58], FATF and the World Bank are 
credible sources from which it can be deciphered that particular countries have a lack of 
legislation on counter-terror finance and money laundering. There may be regions that are 
notorious terrorism hotspots, areas with criminality, corruption[59] and sparsely populated 
areas with poor infrastructure and of course those areas with internal strife (civil war or conflict, 
militia) or military warfare. Thus, charities operating abroad (internationally) must consider 
these matters when carrying out its risk assessments, specifically the circumstances relevant to 
the particular country or locality[60]. The factors the affect risk, for assessment purposes 
includes, the protection under the law, political environment, local law, culture, economic 
structure, concentration of illegality/criminality, levels of illicit trade/money, government 
controls, maturity and size of financial services infrastructure, market and institutions, 
reliability of the service sector etcetera.  
 
5.6. Other Legislation  
 
Given what has been discussed so far, charities must also navigate further financial crime and 
other legislation, the Companies Act 2006 has already been mentioned, particular reference 
also needs to be made the Bribery Act 2010. In addition, there continue to be advances where 
data protection is concerned which Charities, like others, must engage with. The European 
Commission’s Whitepaper ‘Artificial Intelligence - a European approach to excellence and 
trust’ proposes a new regulatory framework for AI, not just to speed up its uptake, but also to 
tackle the human and ethical implications in its use i.e. opaque decision making and bias (Long 
and Agyekum, 2020). In July 2020, the UK's Information Commissioner Officer's (ICO) also 
published guidance on the best practices in data protection-compliant AI.  
 
5.7. Financial Crime Policy (FCP) 
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Charities must have extensive financial crime policy that covers the legislation discussed, in 
addition to appropriate level operational risk assessments. These must set out the course of 
action that is required where a risk presents itself and the limits of risk in terms of appetite, 
standards and objectives; this should guide the operations. This (these), should be accompanied 
by procedures for implementation. To accompany this, stakeholders such as trustees, 
employees and volunteers need to be appropriately trained. The level and systematic alerts 
required will also vary so that risk is effectively mitigated. There also need to be measures in 
place for identification of suspicious activity, reporting and robust scrutiny and review so that 
lessons can be learnt. The FCP needs consistent and regular updating for example when 
legislation changes, organisations or individuals are designated, sanctions are lifted, or new 
ones imposed. Furthermore, criminality does not stand still, criminals find novel ways in which 
to circumvent detection and prevention, smurfing is a good example of this, therefore any FCP 
also needs to consistently develop – something that AI outperforms humans in relation to. 
Readers will begin to note the arduous task, in terms of regulatory compliance, that charities 
face, challenges that AI can easily help navigate.  
 
6. CharityTech: Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning  
 
In this part of the research we focus on the use of technology to resolve the issues identified 
earlier. 
  
Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to technology that enables a machine to simulate the 
behaviour of humans i.e. data, course intelligence, knowledge and understanding, it is therefore 
the ‘brains’ within, for instance, a robot. Therefore, AI systems are smart like humans and able 
to solve complex problems. In contrast, machine learning, which is a subset of AI, allows the 
machine to automatically learn from past data without the need of specific programming. 
RegTech, or what can be termed as CharityTech, is the use of information (data) and 
technology for purposes of ensuring, as far as can be possible, regulatory compliance and 
reporting, mitigating risk, training and developing staff, and harnessing cost reductions. It is 
salient to note that information is currently shared via memorandums of understanding between 
the various charity regulators, amongst others, Charity Commission, Information 
Commissioners Office and the Gambling Commission. Digital data can make this process far 
more effective and less costly.  
 
The process is far more than just the digitization of manual compliance and reporting functions 
i.e. KYC requirements. The potential is to enable real-time changes and monitoring to take 
place and facilitate far more efficient and proportionate regulatory regimes that look to address 
existing and contemporaneous risks. Data, regulation and security (identity etcetera) can be 
relatively easily interwoven to achieve this.  
 
7. Helping to Solve ‘the’ Problems: CharityTech and RegTech  
 
The FCAs ‘Regulatory Sandbox’ circa 2015, has aided the revolution in the use technology 
can be used in novels ways to resolve complex and detailed regulatory compliance problems, 
as have similar schemes across the FinTech[61] spectrum.  
 
An AI and ML digitalization, like that which has cut across many other industries and markets 
such as finance, law, banking and insurance, can bring serious cost saving, compliance and risk 
mitigation benefits for charities. Charities spending on costs is contentious where donors are 
concerned, in 2019 10 of the most popular charities in the UK spent over circa £225Mn on 
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operating costs[62]. The reductions that can be harnessed are salaries, office space, travel 
expense and some marketing costs, this list is not exhaustive. The first has obvious impact on 
donor confidence in the charity and revenue generation, given AI and ML can work 24/7 to 
provide service to internal users and donors etc.  
 
From a compliance (CharityTech) perspective organisations can prevent themselves becoming 
the victims of financial abuse and criminality by having good management and governance 
procedures i.e. the Charity Commissions Governance Code, as well as proper financial controls. 
This will mean that timely audit, training, review and proper risk-based approach to Know 
Your Customer (KYC), Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and Know Your Principles (KYP) is 
undertaken to ascertain the source of funding and the identity of the beneficiary’s. In terms of 
the latter the charity must understand that it is an offence to provide funds to organisations and 
individuals that are proscribed and therefore any ‘system’ must be subject to regular updating 
and be capable of sharing and identifying the same for risk mitigation purposes.  
 
Specifically for charities that operate overseas, they must ensure that they comply with 
domestic (U.K.) regulation (including those set out in 3.1.2.) but also that of the jurisdiction in 
which they operate. Charities must ensure that they are not breaching sanctions regimes and 
embargoes. Furthermore, given the lack of universal criteria on how to assess the risk of terror 
finance by country and region, it is all the more important to have a series of models that can 
be used for the mitigation of this risk. The system in place will need to flag up ‘hotspots’, civil 
strife, terror attacks and other information that affects operations but also compliance. 
Therefore, it must be able to update in real-time by feeding in huge amounts of data and 
information from a multitude of sources if it is to be effective i.e. from the United Kingdom’s 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Financial Conduct Authority, The Charity 
Commission, Transparency International, FATF and the World Bank. All of this requires time, 
money and creates the need for consistent updating of policies but also retraining for staff etc.  
 
The policies, processes and people need to be able to facilitate suspicious transactions and 
patterns of behaviour being spotted from copious amounts and complex data, including 
smurfing as discussed earlier and that too in real-time before it is too late to take action i.e. the 
issuing a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) and regulatory reporting; a very labour intensive 
and costly process. Breaches will not only result in loss but also a negative impact on reputation, 
and donor trust and confidence. Remedies, in law, against charities that fall foul of the law 
include breach of trust, removal of trustees and to direct how charity property is applied[63].  
 
Charities are also at threat from cyber risks i.e. hacking etc. Therefore, other than the 
Companies Act 2006, the organisations must also secure its data from digital criminality[64].  
 
All of these matters require an extensive and regularly up-to-date Financial Crime Policy 
something that charities struggle with. These are all matters that automation, digitalisation or 
RegTech (CharityTech), can assist with.  
 
8. How Can Advances in AI, RegTech and CharityTech be a solution?  
 
Charities must accept that they need to build their own networks to combat criminality through 
sharing information perhaps through privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) that could allow 
data sharing between charities, law enforcement agencies and regulators, and through nascent 
concepts such as homomorphic encryption[65]. 
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The FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox has seen various propositions into digital identity, that is 
securing information that is held by organisation. Whilst the technology centres on allowing 
businesses to check the identity of its customers digitally, machine learning avoids the need for 
a manual security check, the same can be implemented by charities if they adopt the ‘open 
banking model’ that allows the approved secure sharing of some information electronically via 
an application programming interface (API) perhaps with the financial institutions themselves.  
 
The benefit is federated system of real-time updating, financial analysis i.e. donation receipts, 
beneficial ownership and tracking of grants, and identification and information sharing that 
combats financial crime. In addition, flags are raised where a ‘high risk’ donation or pattern is 
identified which allows the system to carry out further KYC or CDD.  
 
Charities, like other organisations, face efficiency challenges in manual systems that seek 
compliance and risk mitigation etcetera. These include;  
 
- Lack of up-to-date information;  
- Human error;  
- Continuous cost of stakeholder training and development;  
- Poor quality data that needs to be cross-checked and corrected;  
- Fragmentation of data affecting decision making;  
- Increasing costs of manual KYC and CDD;  
- False positives in risk analysis resulting in the misallocation of resource i.e. 
investigation of low risk activity or transactions. When calibration tools are added this 
only exaggerates the false-positive problem;   
- Inconsistency in processes, standards and application violating regulatory compliance;  
- Absence of centralised CDD or KYC database;  
- Inconsistencies in suspicious activity reporting;  
- Production of too many or too few reports or analyses;  
- Duplication of processes;  
- Fragmentation of systems that do not interact, resulting in employees having to (a) 
collect data and then (b) analysis the differences between the datasets manually which 
is prone to high error rates;  
- Unreliable processes that cannot adequately assess risk from qualitative and 
quantitative metrics and geographies.  
 
These are just to name a few, other than those already discussed. Technology can be used as 
an enabler but must have the necessary investment as a strategic approach; including:  
 
- Automation of processes that are information centric to reduce manual data collection, 
entry an updating;  
- Using e-KYC and e-CDD;  
- Building and sharing KYC and CDD;  
- Using web-based applications to audit, identify, track, trace, report, carry out link 
analysis (determine beneficial ownership) and interact with other stakeholders; and  
- Using linguistics in data analysis.  
 
Regulatory compliance has undergone a sea change; ethical culture, compliance and 
infrastructure – this is the core of anti-money laundering and counter terror finance initiatives 
but also are important in relation to organisational retraining, controls and governance.  
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9. Conclusion  
 
Presently, charities are yet to harness the benefits of the technological revolution that is 
happening in other sectors. They have an opportunity to solve these problems by turning to AI 
and ML, or as it can be termed RegTech or CharityTech; rapid automation, advanced statistical 
modelling, voice analytics, real-time data aggregation platforms that use fuzzy logic and text 
analytics, and machine learning-based risk assessments. What is required is are further digital 
transformation initiatives. All of which have far better performance than the manual processes 
that are deployed. All of this has global benefits, given the size of the global charity sectors 
and the fact that perpetrators operate transnationally. This opportunity will help charities cut 
their operational costs and improve compliance but also donor trust and confidence; there must 
be a shift to looking forward towards a sustainable approach, growth in the charity sector means 
the problems will only grow. Technology and advanced analytics can help increase 
effectiveness and efficiency. Rather than expanding their people base, surgical automation and 
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